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WHEN BULL MARKET MYTHS UNRAVEL
GRETCHEN MORGENSON*
As a New York Times journalist charged with covering the financial
markets in the late 1990's, I had a front row seat to watch the biggest stock
market bubble of all time inflate. It was nothing short of amazing to witness
an era of rapacious speculation in the financial markets that will stand as a
record for decades, if not generations.
Today, three years later, the mania seems almost to have become a
dream, so quickly has it receded into memory. But its unraveling has also
become a nightmare that investors, regulators and corporate executives find
difficult to shake.
As investors seek answers to why they lost trillions of dollars in the
stock market in the past three years, one path of blame leads directly to the
door of many financial journalists who abandoned their jobs as outsiders,
truth-seekers and skeptics. These reporters, whether they realized it or not,
became collaborators with executives in what later proved to be deceptions
and lies.
While much has been written about the shocking failures of the accounting industry to identify corporate chicanery in financial statements,
much less has been told about the appallingly lax performance by the financial media.
Journalists are always tempted, of course, to put powerful people on
ever loftier pedestals. And in the 1980s and 1990s, CEOs had amassed an
almost cult following. All too often the crowd cheering the CEOs on included journalists.
The problem with reporters worshipping the people they must cover is
that it results in journalists becoming little more than an arm of a company's
public relations machinery. In such a circumstance, journalists lose their
objectivity and cannot question what the executives tell them.
Some financial journalists may have been gulled during the stock market's bubble years into believing that the so-called New Economy meant
share prices would only go up and that the people running these companies
were nothing less than geniuses. But in some cases, journalists became active and even forceful defenders of management, aiding and abetting their
dubious practices by refusing to question the executives either in print or in
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interviews. Some reporters also failed by not questioning what passed as
conventional wisdom but which turned out to be so foolish.
Call it the Emperor's New Clothes, bull-market style. There were far
too many examples of corporate spin, half-truths and lies that financial journalists helped to promote during the bubble years.
Consider the Enron Corporation, known and admired for years as one of
the nation's most innovative companies. Now, of course, the only innovations the company will be remembered for are the labyrinthine schemes it
used to mislead investors about its financial position.
Since Enron filed for bankruptcy in late 2001, it has become painfully
clear how often Enron substituted fantasy for reality in its reports to shareholders. As a result, many investors were stunned that a company as big,
profitable and powerful as Enron could slide into oblivion as quickly as it did
that autumn.
One reason Enron slid so fast is that it was neither as large nor as profitable as it claimed. Consider Enron's rank in 2001 as No. 7 on the Fortune
500 list of largest American companies. The company's $101 billion in reported revenue placed it between two powerhouses--Citigroup and I.B.M.on the prestigious Fortune list.
But Enron was able to rise to that level only because energy trading
companies are allowed to record the total amount of their transactions as
revenue, rather than the actual profits made on each trade, as is typical at
brokerage firms. If viewed the way other trading firms are, Enron's revenue
would have been $6.3 billion that year, pushing it to the bottom half of Fortune's list. If Fortune'seditors had calculated Enron's revenues in the traditional fashion, the company would have come in at number 287, wedged
rather more unglamorously between Automatic Data Processing and Campbell Soup.
By including Enron in its pantheon of top ten companies, Fortune'seditors were not technically in error. After all, the company's appearance on the
list was based upon its annual report, a document which most reporters consider reliable.
But the Enron ranking in Fortune did help the company burnish its image as a genuine player instead of the cipher that it was. And since those
revenues were artificially high, Enron's inclusion on the list certainly looks
unjustified now. And more than a little embarrassing.
Also embarrassing was the way financial journalists reported on daytraders, that quintessential bull market phenomenon in which otherwise sensible people quit their day jobs to sit in front of computer screens and try to
make a living trading stocks.
In the early years journalists gave daytraders' claims of easy money far
too much credibility. Many reporters who wrote about daytraders took the
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people running the brokerage operations at their word when they told them
that most people make money daytrading stocks. Never mind that even the
professional traders at some of the firms lost money daytrading stocks. My
fear is that such stories may have helped lure unsuspecting investors into
such daytrading rooms.
While it is always problematic for journalists to let down their guard, it
was particularly dangerous during the stock market mania for reporters to
believe everything that corporate executives told them. The danger was
greatest to the stock market novice, the reader or television viewer who knew
little about investing. Because there were so many more of these people
entering the market during the 1990s, reporters and their editors should have
been on heightened alert to protect them. These unsophisticated investors
needed protection and we journalists let them down.
Corporate executives, on the other hand, got way too much protection
from journalists. In effect, some reporters actually helped corporate spinmeisters at their games, which wound up hurting investors.
One example of this was in the charade of reporting, breathlessly, that a
company had "beat" its earnings estimates by the proverbial penny per share.
Everyone knows that a penny isn't worth much nowadays. Only Wall Street
could figure out how to make a penny worth something very significant-a
rising stock price.
While these na've reports of earnings gains made it seem that corporate
earnings were surprisingly higher than expected, in fact the "penny better"
nonsense was a manipulative and cynical design of the companies involved.
Corporate executives talked Wall Street analysts down to a level in their estimates that the executives knew they could beat and then-surprise! They
beat them.
Research organizations like First Call/Thomson Financial compile analysts' earnings estimates daily to provide a consensus of what Wall Street
analysts think a company will earn. With all eyes on the magic earnings
number, and this was especially the case during the market mania, not meeting the number could kill a stock. At the same time, when a company beat
the magic number, its stock often went soaring.
On December 14, 1999, for example, after the close of trading, Oracle
announced that it had beat earnings expectations by four cents a share. Its
stock immediately leaped 9%.
But the National City Corporation of Cleveland, the nation's tenthlargest bank, received decidedly different treatment from traders. In October
1999, when it announced third-quarter earnings of 57 cents a share, the
bank's results were 9.6% ahead of those achieved in the same period a year
earlier.
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But because Wall Street had been forecasting 58 cents a share, a penny
more than the bank actually reported, investors fled the stock, lopping more
than 5% off its value the day of the announcement.
None of these gyrations would really matter, of course, if corporate executives' compensation wasn't so heavily reliant on rising stock prices. But
these compensation packages are stock-price obsessed, even today. As a
result, the power of positive corporate spin has become crucially important to
managers in recent years. And beating Wall Street estimates, if only by a
penny, helped enrich executives.
Investors ended up being worse off for the charade, however, because
while the earnings reports drove up stock prices temporarily, they didn't
really translate into long-term gains for shareholders. In fact, these manipulations were one of the reasons stock prices got so outlandish in 1999 and
2000 and why these prices have crashed so dramatically since then.
Financial journalists were also far too willing to accept and print dubious profit calculations that companies have come to call pro forma earnings.
These are earnings that are not calculated according to generally accepted
accounting principles but are a company's results as if Dr. Pangloss were
running the books. Pro forma reporting of earnings presents the best of all
possible corporate worlds. Or as Lynn Turner, the former chief accountant
of the Securities and Exchange Commission called it, earnings before all the
bad stuff.
How each company computes its pro forma earnings varies, but the figures are always employed to make the financials prettier than they otherwise
would be. Pro forma numbers often exclude such expense items as payroll
taxes or interest costs, and mean that the company's results appear far better
than they actually are. I would like to be able to show a personal income
statement that does not include my mortgage interest, who wouldn't? But
asking investors to ignore these costs-which the companies must pay, after
all-is asking them to accept a fiction about a company's results.
It is one thing for companies to try to pull pro forma fast ones on investors. It is quite another for journalists to allow them to do so in print. But
that is exactly what happened during the mania and to this day it is still a
problem among some reporters.
Pro forma reporting has gotten a bad name recently among investors
battered by numerous corporate scandals and they are all too aware, now, of
the damage that aggressive accounting can cause. But for far too long, journalists swallowed pro forma figures from companies without question and
published them as though they were fair representations of a company's operations. Which they were not.
Reporters also trumpeted the bull market notion that so-called new
economy stocks were a breed apart and should not be held to stringent, old
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economy investing standards. Internet companies and cutting-edge telecommunications concerns were, after all, revolutionizing the world. As a
result, many journalists argued, their share prices deserved equally radical
valuation methods. Out went traditional methods used by securities analysis
that prized genuine cash flow and earnings. In came freewheeling measures
of worth, like revenue growth, Web site traffic and even customer "share of
mind." Never mind that none of these measures took into account how much
money a company could make from its customers.
While Mary Meeker, the star Internet analyst at Morgan Stanley, may
have believed that baloney, journalists should not have. After all, journalists
should not be simply stenographers; they are supposed to be tough-minded,
independent-thinking skeptics. Or as the Hungarian proverb puts it, the believer is happy but the doubter is wise.
I know well that it is not easy to be contrarian; the journalists who
sowed the seeds of reasonable doubt in stories about Tyco International's
accounting were not likely to get invited to the Gatsbyesque party thrown by
Dennis Kozlowski on the island of Sardinia for his wife's 40th birthday. But
not receiving such invitations should not bother a reporter. Being off that list
should be viewed as a badge of honor.
While it is a surprise as well as a disappointment how assiduously the
financial press aided and abetted the other, more corrupt members of the bull
market cheerleading squad, the degree to which securities regulators let novice investors wade happily into the stock market's shark infested waters in
the late 1990s is equally disillusioning.
Both the press and the regulators should have been working to let the
hot air out of the enormous bubble that Wall Street and corporate executives
had inflated. Instead, there was a disturbing breakdown of the safeguards put
in place to protect investors from themselves and from corrupt brokers or
analysts. Securities regulators, the financial media, and of course the major
accounting firms all failed dismally to rein in the frenzy, spotlight the perpetrators and bring reason to the irrational exuberance.
While regulators will always be overworked and underpaid, the manner
in which the Securities and Exchange Commission ("S.E.C") acquiesced to
corporate heavyweights on one crucial issue in 1995 probably contributed
more to the construction of the mania and the destruction of wealth that followed it than any other single event. That issue was the fight over how to
account for stock options.
Back in 1995, the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"), the
standards-setter for accounting rules, tried to force companies to account for
stock options they dispense as an employee cost. The FASB, which has little
clout when it comes to battling powerful corporations, came under severe
pressure from technology companies to retreat on the issue. Congress joined
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in the fray, siding with the companies who were pouring money into their
reelection coffers. And when the standards board asked for help from the
S.E.C. on the issue, the regulators caved. And FASB could do nothing but
retreat as well.
There were two results of this retreat. In the simplest terms, companies
were allowed to continue handing out oodles of options to their executives
and not deduct their enormous costs from the company's coffers. And because stock options did represent a cost to shareholders, the inaction
on them encouraged companies to misrepresent their financial positions to
shareholders.
But in a much broader sense, I would argue that the big cave-in on options was the single largest contributor to the mania, the corporate chicanery,
and the ensuing wealth destruction that has shaken America to its core. Today's deplorable corporate greed could not have been satisfied without stock
options. Put another way, the love of stock options is the root of all evil in
corporate America.
Enron, Global Crossing and WorldCom were very different kinds of
companies. But their collapses have a common thread. By misrepresenting
the financial position of their companies, executives watched their stock
prices soar and became richer in the process. After the misrepresentations
were disclosed, shareholders and employees were left with little or nothing.
Stock options were a part of all these failures. They were crucial to
both the misrepresentation and the enrichment that have caused a crisis of
confidence in business and financial markets. Options are doled out as free
money to executives and are the force behind the increasingly lucrative compensation packages at American companies. Because they are tied to the
company's performance, they can be powerful incentive for executives to
make their results look better than they actually are. To cook the books.
At the same time that stock options enrich corporate executives, they
harm shareholders and investors.
Because of the way options have been treated in financial statements,
they helped executives shade the truth in two ways. First, they allow companies to overstate their earnings because the costs of options has not been deducted from a company's revenues as salary or compensation. In addition,
options generate significant cash flow from employees that has nothing to do
with day-to-day operations.
Options also help companies pad earnings by reducing and even eliminating taxes owed to the federal government. Since executive pay is often
linked to a company's earnings, the overstatements that stock options produce can mean fatter paychecks for management.
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Once a rarity, options are now ubiquitous at American companies; in
the last ten years, options have risen from 5% of shares outstanding at major
companies to 15%.
The numbers at some companies are enormous. According to Bear,
Steams, option costs at Microsoft came in at $3.3 billion last year, almost a
third of the company's reported net income. The cost of options at Cisco
Systems was $2.6 billion and at Nortel Networks it was $2.5 billion. Cisco
and Nortel reported losses for the year, and they didn't even deduct the cost
of stock options from their results.
Heavy use of stock options dilutes existing shareholders' stakes by
greatly increasing the shares outstanding. In order to tame this growth in
shares, companies must buy back stock. In recent years, many companies
have paid exorbitant prices to buy back their shares and some have even borrowed money to do so. This is not a good use of company cash.
As options have become more popular, their beneficial effect on company earnings has done so as well. One New York City brokerage firm estimates that if the nation's 500 largest companies had deducted the cost of
options from their revenues, their annual profit growth from 1995 to 2000
would have been 6%, not the 9% these companies reported.
Back to the recent corporate scandals. WorldCom, for example, was a
big user of stock options, and its financial results looked much better, for a
time, because of them. Of the large companies in the telecom sector, WorldCoin's earnings were the most greatly enhanced by its option grants. Had
the company accounted for options as an employee cost in 2001, its earnings
would have been 57% lower. In 2000, WorldCom's earnings would have
fallen almost 30%, and in 1999, results would have been 22% lower.
When employees exercise options, the tax they owe on the transaction
becomes a deduction for the company issuing the shares. As a result, profitable companies that are heavy users of options, including Microsoft, Cisco
Systems and Dell Computer, have erased much if not all of what they owed
to the federal government in taxes in recent years. At Enron, for example,
deductions for stock options helped eliminate more than $625 million in
taxes that the company owed to the government from 1996 to 2000.
Companies reap another benefit when their employees exercise options.
An employee pays the company to buy the shares outright. That generates
excess cash flow, which only attentive investors will see has nothing to do
with day-to-day operations. At WorldCom, for example, half the company's
free cash flow in 1999-$886 million-came from workers exercising
options.
Proponents of options say that they help to align management's interests
with those of shareholders. If an executive performs well, his or her company's stock price will rise and all stockholders will benefit.
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Even now, after all the scandals, these people still argue that the costs of
options should not be deducted from companies' income because that would
discourage the use of options and ordinary workers would be denied a source
of wealth. And once again, certain members of Congress--especially those
who receive money from Silicon Valley executives-are trying to make sure
that options are not accounted for properly.
But in the current environment, arguing for an accounting practice that
can be viewed as clouding a company's results rather than clarifying them is
becoming tricky. And the argument that rank-and-file workers will be hurt
most if companies stop issuing options loses credibility after an examination
of corporate filings.
Top executives reap the primary share of options granted at most major
companies. According to a recent study by Joseph Blasi and Douglas Kruse,
professors at Rutgers University, 59.4% of options went to the top five executives of Baker-Hughes, an oil drilling concern, on average between 1991
and 2001. At Alcan, the precentage was 52.1, and at Dillard's Department
Store, 47% of all the options dispensed went to the top five executives.
Once again, accounting rulemakers are trying to force companies to expense stock options. But the damage has been done. What started as a tool
for corporate good has really ended up in many cases as just another instrument to allow the siphoning of wealth to senior management from
shareholders.
One of the reasons options are so pernicious is that they encourage executives to do whatever they must to keep their stock prices up and their options valuable.
Obsessing about the stock price gives management the incentive to
dress up their companies' earnings through the use of questionable accounting or, even worse, cooking the books. Caring too deeply about a stock price
gives managers a reason to put out opaque financials to shareholders. After
all, if the news is not good, why detail it? That would surely drive down the
stock. No need to make the shareholders worry their pretty little heads over
things like off-balance sheet financing or special purpose entities!
Obsessing over stock prices also gives executives a perverse incentive
to drive their stock lower to get new option grants at bargain basement
prices. It is almost impossible to believe that anyone would resort to such a
thing, but the incentives are surely there.
And when executives have so much of their compensation tied to the
price of their company's stock, they are encouraged to be stock promoters or
even crooks like Dennis Kozlowski is accused of being. Chief executives
used to be more concerned with corporate operations. Now they are chief
cheerleaders or spinmeisters. And in some cases, chief book cookers.
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Consider what went on at WorldCom. In determining its top executives' bonuses in 2001, the proxy says, the company assessed revenue, earnings and the market value of its common stock. But it also used an unusual
measure: billings by WorldCom under service agreements with its customers. Customer billing records are among the documents that the S.E.C. requested from WorldCom last March as part of its investigation into the company's accounting practices. Questionable billing practices are among the
problems dogging WorldCom.
It is far too simple of course to conclude that executive compensation
plans can serve as a road map to where corporate cheating might go on, but it
is becoming distressingly clear that the pay-for-performance philosophy that
was supposed to align executives' interests with shareholders' has been
badly distorted.
The fact is, chief executives have pulled off one of the greatest heists in
history: the transfer of shareholder wealth in clear light of day in recent years
has been nothing short of amazing.
And by not backing FASB in forcing companies to expense the costs of
their options, the S.E.C. must take some responsibility for the mess. To his
credit, Arthur Levitt, the former S.E.C. chairman, identified this as the biggest mistake he made during his tenure in his book Take On The Street.
Where were the editors, for example, when their reporters allowed analysts or fund managers to tout stocks that they owned or had an interest in
seeing rise? Where were the business editors when their reporters quoted or
highlighted the views of fund managers or strategists whose records in
stockpicking or forecasting were abysmal? I can recall seeing fairly many
quotes from a fund manager who may have been quite quotable but who had
in a recent year lost his investors 80% of their money.
Many journalists were happy to quote analysts on companies' prospects
without knowing or checking whether some of them owned shares in the
very companies they were promoting. And many reporters assigned credibility to analysts' opinions even though their independence was corrupted by
massive investment banking fees they helped their firms to generate. These
people were nothing like unbiased, but their views were presented as such by
far too many journalists.
Equity analysts have always been conflicted, they have always served
too many masters. But analysts' biases became far worse during the bull
market than they had been in previous decades. During the mania, many of
them didn't even try to serve investors. Instead, they worked singlemindedly
toward their portion of the investment banking fees that promised to make
them even richer than they already were.
Unfortunately, many reporters and editors were slow to see how analysts' conflicts had grown, and they relied upon them for far too long. In so

Published by NSUWorks, 2004

9

Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 2

NOVA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 28:2:223

doing, reporters and editors helped to make stock analysts the investing
world's equivalent of rock stars.
Prior to the bull market mania, equity analysts operated in obscurity.
Nobody knew their names, much less what they looked like. But during the
bubble years, thanks to what became widespread interest in investing, analysts became regular features on television programs and in news columns.
They commanded packages of millions per year based largely on their ability
to bring investment banking fees to the firms they worked for.
But they could not earn these millions if they made negative utterances
about the companies they followed. So while the stock market rose to at alltime record highs, there were few outright sell recommendations among
large brokerage firn analysts. Instead of warning investors away from the
precipice, analysts egged them on.
With stock analysts less inclined to produce unbiased information,
many financial journalists lost what had been a significant source of data.
Now they must look elsewhere for guidance, story ideas or opinions. Or they
must sharpen their pencils and do the work themselves.
As millions of investors rushed into the stock market in the 1990s, they
did so believing that Wall Street was at least a fairly level playing field.
They have since learned how illusory that notion was, and this loss of innocence continues to weigh heavily on the stock market overall.
But there is some good news in the ugly corporate stories that we have
seen in recent months. At least now the euphoria that characterized investing
in the late 1990's is gone. The wide-eyed acceptance of every word corporate executives uttered, of every financial statement they released, of every
outlandish projection an analyst made has been replaced by a sense among
investors that trust must once again be earned, that skepticism is a worthy
trait, that the advice of analysts can be costly.
Journalists have also learned some lessons. The days when reporters
chose to celebrate CEOs appears to be over. More reporters and editors now
know that they must carefully scrutinize the numbers fed to them by companies, and question the analysis of deeply conflicted Wall Street research departments.
It is clear that investors have learned a great deal in the three years since
the stock market peaked. It has been a painful but necessary experience. My
hope is that going forward, executives, their companies, and securities regulators will be more vigilant about eradicating fraud and bad corporate behavior. And financial journalists in coming years need to be more skeptical of
what they are told and must work harder to be advocates for investors rather
than celebrators of the perpetrators.
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